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IN THE S.UPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE, OF UTAH 
NELLIE A. LQVETT, 
Plaint~ff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
THE CONTINENTAL BANK AND 
TRUST COMPANY, a corporation, 
Executor of the Estate of Mrs. J. U. 
Giesy, also known as Juliet Galena 
Gie~sy,· Deceased, 
Defendant and Appellarnt. 
BRIEF. OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8199 
This action arose out of a claim asserted by Nellie 
A. Love~tt, plaintiff below, respondent herein, against 
The Continental Bank and Trust Company, defendant 
below, appellant herein, as Executor of the Estate of Mrs·. 
J. U. Giesy, for certain jewelry claimed 'by Mrs. Lovett. 
to have heen given to her by Mrs. Giesy, prior to her· 
death, and for compensation for services claimed by Mrs. 
Lovett to have been rendered for Mrs. Giesy. 
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Mrs. Giesy was the widow of a physician who had 
formerly practiced in Salt Lake City. She resided in 
the Marylan'd Apartments on East South T'emple Street. 
She died in 1953, ·at an age of approximately 76 years.· 
Mrs. Lovett i~s the wife of Harry D. Lovett, an 
accountant for 31 years at Utah Power and Light Com .. 
pany. He testified that his wife visited ¥rs. Giesy in 
May of 1950 and from that time until the time of Mrs. 
Giesy's death on March 17, 1953, performed numerous 
personal services for Mrs. Giesy such as house work and 
personal beauty work; that during this period his wif.e 
accompanied Mrs. Giesy to The Continental Bank and 
Trust Company and to h.er physician, Dr. Smith, and 
that Mrs. Love·tt from time to time made out checks for 
Mrs. Giesy and assisted ·her with her correspondence. 
Curiously, however, Mrs. Lovett was not seeking 
employment when she went to visit Mrs. Giesy that May 
in 1950 (R. 56), and Mrs. Giesy had in her employ several 
persons from time to time - Mrs. Alene Dougl·as, a 
negress, Mrs. ·Haig and Mrs. Maddocks (R. 31, 38, 39). 
On Sunday afternoons Mr. and nfrs. Lo¥ett and 
Mrs. Giesy often went for automobile rides together, as 
Mr. Lovett said, to make Mrs. Giesy's life as happy as 
possible (R. 72). Mrs. Uiesy, compared Mr. Lovett to 
her husband, Dr. Giesy, in commenting th·at Dr. Giesy 
never took her to the gas station to buy gasoline (R. 72). 
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Mr. and Mrs. Lovett had dinner with Mrs. Giesy. 
"lots of tim·es" during their association, sometimes in 
Mrs. Giesy's apartment, sometimes in restaurants while 
they would be enjoying automobile rides together. Some-
times Mrs. Giesy would pay the check, sometimes Mr. 
Lovett would pay the check (R. 72). None of the persons 
ernployed by Mrs. Giesy were o~bserved eating with her, 
however ( R. 62, 63). 
· Mrs. Giesy often went with Mrs. Lovett to watch 
Mr. Lovett bowl (R. 72). 
In all, their association appeared to be a mutually 
enjoyable one, typical of many friendly social relation-
ships. And as would be expected, Mrs. Lovett was never 
paid any money during all the ~ime she was acquainted 
with Mrs. Giesy (R. 66). All employees of Mrs. Giesy 
were paid regularly (R. 67). 
In spite of the obvious bond of affection between 
Mrs. Love~tt and Mrs. Giesy, Mr. Lovett was careful to 
state that while ~Irs. Giesy liked Mrs. Lovett, Mrs. 
Lovett's emotion was one of "respect" (R. 73). 
About six months after the May visit at Mrs. Giesy's 
apartment, Mrs. Giesy, in the company of Mrs. Lovett 
purchased a large diamond ring (Ex. 1) from Daynes 
Jewelry. for $2,070.00. 
In October, 1952, Mrs. Giesy entered the hospital 
(R. 35). She remained there for a period of six or s·even 
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weeks (R. 36), leaving in the 1niddle of Nove1nber. While 
there, her jewelry was placed in a vault in the hospital 
(R. 46). 
Mr. Lovett testified that during the latter part of 
November, 1952, while visiting Mrs. Gie'sy, Mrs. Gies' 
said that she wanted Mrs. Lo.vett to have the ring and 
handed it to her in an envelope (Ex. 2) which contained 
a box with the ring inside of the box. 
On Friday, March 13, 1953, Mrs. Giesy became 
acutely ill. She continued to get worse from Friday 
morning until Saturday when Mrs. M·addocks, her nurse, 
called Dr. Smith (R. 79). Dr. Smith, the personal physi-
cian and friend of Mrs. Gie'sy called upon her that day 
and again Sunday n1ornin·g. On Sunday morning Dr. 
Smith said that Mrs. Giesy would have to go to the 
hospital. 
She had been very ill on the 13th, 14th and 15th; and 
Dr. Smith hald wanted her to· go to the hospital earlier, 
but she did not want to go (R. 117). On Sunday morning 
he insisted. 
He told Mrs. Giesy that he did not want her to take 
her jewelry to the hospital because he had a great deal 
of difficulty with her jewelry at tunes when she was in 
the hospital before . He said: 
"I don't want to be bothered with it. I don't 
intend to be responsible; I don't intend to have 
the hospital held responsible." 
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lie suggested that she have Mrs. Lovett take charge of 
the jewelry. Mrs. Giesy said that she would (R·. 117). 
She directed Mrs. Maddocks to call Mrs. Lovett so that 
she could turn the jewelry over to her. 
At about one o'clock on March 15, 1953, Mrs. Giesy 
was taken to the hospital. Mrs. Maddocks testified that 
she was instructed to follow her with the jewels. How-
ever, Mrs. Maddocks said she ~ad a blowout in the drive-
way so she called Mr. and ~frs. Lovett and requested 
that they take her to the hospital. 
When Nir. and Mrs. Lovett arrived at Mrs. Giesy's 
apartment, 1\{rs. Lovett went in the apartment and Mr. 
Lovett remained in the car. When Mrs. Lovett came out 
of the apartment, she was carrying a jewel bo~ (Ex. 12). 
Mr. Lovett, Mrs. Lovett, and Mrs. Maddocks then went 
to the L.D.S. Hospital. When they arrived at the hos-
pital, Mrs. Lovett and Mrs. Maddocks went inside. Mr. 
Lovett remained in the car to examine the jewelry (R. 
49). He saw in the box certain i terns of jewelry (Ex. 3 
through 11, except 6). When Mrs. Lovett and Mrs. ·Mad-
docks returned, Mr. Lovett drove then1 home. 
That evening Mr. and Mrs. Lovett returned to the 
hospital to visit Mrs. Giesy. Mr. Lovett testified that 
Mrs. Giesy said that she wanted Mrs. Lovett to have the 
jewelry. Mr. Lovett put the jewelry in his safety box at 
Walker Bank Building. 
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During the night of March 16 and the 1norning of 
March 17, Mrs. Gie'sy was in a stuporous condition. That 
morning Mr. and Mrs. Lovett 'vere advised by a nurse 
at the hospital that Mrs. Giesy was dying and to hurry 
to the hospital. Twenty minutes later Dr. Smith called 
and sai'd that Mrs. Giesy had died. Mr. and Mrs. Lo:vett 
went to the hospital, arriving thet'e at_ approximately 
6 :'30 a.m. They met a nurse, Mrs. Garrison, in Mrs. 
Gie~sy's room. Mrs. Giesy's body was in the room at the 
time. She had on her ears a pair of diamond earrings 
(Ex. 6). At the -request of 1\tfrs. Lovett, the earrings were 
removed from Mrs. Giesy's body by ~1:rs. Garrison and 
handed to Mrs. Lovett ( R. 54) . 
Within four days following Mrs. Giesy's death, and 
within a day or two following the funeral, Mrs. Lovett 
called Mr. D. A. Skeen, Mrs. Giesy's attorney, and asked 
if she could 'see him. She was told that she could and she 
went to his -office. She asked about the will and it was 
either read to her or she was given its substance .. Mrs. 
Lovett previously knew she was a beneficiary under the 
will (R. 143). 
She said that she had a box containing Mrs. Giesy's 
jewelry and asked what she should do with it. S-he said 
that ~she had taken it because she didn't want to leave it 
in the home after Mrs. Giesy's going to the hospital (R. 
139). Mr. Skeen said he though.t they should call Mr. 
O'Meara, Trust Officer of The Continental Bank, Execu-
tor of the Will. When Mr. O'Meara arrived, he asked 
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Mrs. Lovett for the jewelry which, he had been advised, 
was in her possession. She said that she would turn it 
over to him. She said that she had it in a safety deposit 
box for "safekeeping." She refused to turn over the large 
dian1ond ring purchased from Daynes, however, s1nce, 
she claimed, "it had been given to her." (R~ 131). 
Mr. O'Meara, who arrived inunediately after Mrs. 
Lovett had learneq the contents of the will, observed that 
she was "upset, even shocked". Under the terms of the 
will, Mrs. Lovett was t<? receive a collection of ceramic 
geese figurines and a needlepoint rocking chair. Mr. 
Lovett was to receive a piano (R. 132, Ex. 21). 
Mrs. Lovett called Dr. Smith and asked him to come 
to her home. He did so. Mrs. Lovett said she had all of 
the jewelry. Dr. Smith replied that when Mr. O'Meara 
asked for the jewelry, she should turn it over to him. 
She said that she would. She did not suggest in any way 
that it had been given to her (R. 119). 
A day or two prior to April 3, 1953, Mr. O'Meara 
discussed the jewelry 'vith Mr. Edward M. Morrissey, 
attorney, who at this time had been employed by Mrs. 
Lovett. He said if demand were rnade he would advise 
Mrs. Lovett to return the jewelry, without waiving any 
claim she might have. Demand was made on April 3, 
1953 (Ex. 15). Mrs. Lovett was ad~ised to return all 
jewelry ~xcept the large ring, that claim would probably 
not be made for the ring (R·. 90, 91, 92). All jewelry 
except the ring was later delivered to the bank. 
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Sometime later, Mrs. Lovett can1e to Dr. Smith's 
offi~e and said that she had turned all the jewelry over 
to the estate, except the large ring. She said "they were 
going to try to take the ring from her" (R~ 120), and 
added that she was considering claiming all of the 
jewelry. Yet even to Dr. S.mith, whom she had visited 
with Mrs. Giesy for almost three years, she did not say it 
had been given to her. She had been "advi·sed to claim 
it." (R. 121). 
On Jun'e 13, 1953, a suit was filed in which the first 
cause of action sought to recover the jewelry which had 
been delivered to The Continental Bank and Trust Com-
pany. The second cause of action asked for $3,300.00, 
which it was alleged Mrs .. Giesy agreed to pay Mrs. 
Lovett for services (R. 2). The Bank counterclaimed for 
the large ring. o·n F'ebruary 16, 1954, the jury returned 
a verdict for the plaintiff for the jewelry, excep·t the 
earrings which had been withdrawn from their conside.ra-
tion on motion, and for $3,300.00. 
On February 17, 1954, the Bank moved for a new 
trial or for judgment not withstanding the verdict~ This 
motion was d·enied. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MA'ITER 
OF LAW TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF ON PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
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II. THE -EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT IN FA VO·R OF 
PLAINTIFF ON PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
1. Tbere is no evidenc·e to support an express contract 
of employment as pleaded in plaintiff's complaint. 
2. The evidence of implied contract of employment is 
insufficient as a matter of law to justify the verdict 
in faV10r of pb1iritiff. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CHARGE TO 
THE JURY. 
1. Instruction No. 3 is erroneous as a matter of law 
in that it places the burden of negativing · a gift 
upon the defendant. 
2. Instruction No. 6 is erroneous as a matter of law 
in that it is a misstatement of the law as it pertains 
to delivery of the subject of an aUeged gift. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF ON PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
In her first cause of action plaintiff claimed that she 
was the owner of and entitled to possession of the pieces 
of jewelry involved in this case. Her claim of ownership 
is based upon an alleged gift, claimed to have b~en made 
on March 13, 1953. 
Th~ law is well settled that one who asserts title by 
gift has the burden of proving that a gift was Inade, in-
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eluding the exi'Stence of all of the elements essential to 
its validity. A clear and un1nis~akeable intention on the 
part of the donor to make a gift of his property is one 
of the essential requisites. Jones, et al., v. Cook (Utah, 
1950) 223 P .. (2d) 423. 
In the Jones Case, Leah C. Jones brought action 
against Mark B. Cook as Executor of the Estate of Mark 
Cook, his father, for conversion of an automobile which 
Mris. Jones claimed as a residuary legatee under the last 
will and testament of 1\iark Cook. The evidence in that 
case showed that the defendant Mark B. Cook paid the 
taxes on the automobile beginning with the year 1944. 
Mark Cook ·died in July, 1943. The certificate of owner-
ship was in the name of Mark Cook. Mark B. Cook used 
the automobile p·art of the time but it was left in a 
garage on the homestead of the parents most of the time. 
Defendant at that time had no passenger car of his own 
hut he had a truck. Up to the time of trial defendant 
made no claim to the effect that he acquired title by 
virtue of a parole gift from his father in May, 1943. At 
the time of trial, however, h'e set up such a defense. His 
wife testified that in May, 1943, Mark Cook came over 
to the home of defendant and requested defendant to 
take him for a ride in th·e car. The witness was invited 
to go along. The father then handed the defendant the 
certificate of title to the automobile an·d ·said, "Mark, 
here is the certificate of ownership and the extra set of 
keys to the car. I'm giving it to you with the understand-
ing that you take mother and I at any time we want to 
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go." Defendant did not tell plaintiff at any time prior 
to the trial that his father had made a gift of the car to 
him. His wife testified that the father told her husband 
to say nothing to anyone about the matter. 
This Court said : 
"There is no presumption in favor of a gift 
inter vivos. One who aS'serts title by gift inter 
vivos has the. burden of proving that a gift was 
made inciudirig the existence of all of the elements 
essential to its validity. (Citing Authorities). 
The rule is that 'a clear and unmistakea:ble inten-
tion on the· part of the donor to make a gift of his 
property is an essential requisite of a gift inter 
vivos.' (Citing Authorities)." 
It was held in that case that the defendant did not 
prove a parole gift by clear and convincing evidence. 
The certificate of ownership was not endor~sed; there was 
a serious dispute as to when defendant obtained posses-
sion of the certificate; and it was doubtful as .to whether 
the alleged donor was divested of all dominion and con-
trol over the pr·operty since the father was unable to 
drive the car, and it was kept on the father's. premises 
except when defendant was using it; defendant did not_ 
claim a gift for four years, and the assertion of such 
contention for the first time when the case went to trial 
suggests that the idea of a gift was an after-thought. 
The judgment of the lower court in favor of defendant 
was reversed. 
rrhe evidence before the coul't as to the alleged gift 
in the instant case is likewise not clear and convincing. 
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Mrs. Maddocks was -specifically directed by Mrs. 
Giesy to follow the a1nbulance to the hospital with the 
jewelry. Instead, she telephoned Mrs. Lovett to come 
to the apartment, and when she arrived, handed to her 
the. jewelry ( R. 80) . 
By her instructions to Mrs. Maddocks, Mrs. Giesy 
expre'S'sed clearly an intention to retain do1ninion and 
control over the j'ewelry. 
Mrs. Giesy told DT. S1nith just before she le.ft for 
the hospital that she would have Mrs. Lovett take charge 
of her jewelry while ·she was in the hospital (R. 117). 
No claim of gift was made while Mrs. Giesy was 
living even though Mrs. Maddocks handed the jewelry to 
Mrs. Lovett two days p·tior to Mrs. Giesy's death. It was 
not mentioned to Dr. Smith even though M~s. Lovett had 
_lmown hin1 and of his relationship of friend and physi-
cian of Mrs. Giesy for at least three years. 
A few days after Mrs. Giesy's .death, at the home of 
Mrs. Lovett, Dr. Smith was told by Mrs. Lovett that 
she would turn over all jewelry except the large ring to 
Mr. O'M~eara. She made no claim of gift (R. 119). This 
conversation, oddly, was at the instance of Mrs. Lovett. 
She wanted to know what to do with the jewelry. 
P·eculiar, to say the least, if she thought Mrs. Giesy had 
given it to her. Why differentiate betwe.en the large ring 
and the other jewelry1 The answer is obvious. She was 
"-advised" to make claim of gift of the other jewelry (R. 
121). 
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Mrs. Lovett told Mr. Skeen and Mr. O'Meara that 
she had the jewelry for "safekeeping" (R. 131). She said 
she would withhold the large ring, "because it ~ad been 
given to her" (R. 131, emphasis added), but the. other 
jewelry would be delivered to Mr. O'Meara. 
Counsel attempted to show by the testimony of Mr. 
Morrissey, Mrs. Lovett's attorney rat that time, that when 
the jewelry was delivered to the Bank, 1frs. Lovett was 
not admitting anything. It is indeed significant that the 
conversation between Mr. Morrissey and Mr. O'Meara 
was about two weeks after the conve-rsations between 
Mrs. Lovett and Dr. Smith, and Mrs. Lovett and Mr.· 
Skeen and Mr. O'Meara at Mr. Skeen's office . Mr. Mor-
rissey did not advise Mrs. Lovett to return the jewelry 
until after April 3, 1953, two weeks after she had al~eady 
agreed to do so. (R. 110, 119, 131). 
Although numerous opportunities were presented, 
Mrs. Lovett never claimed that a gift of the jewelry to 
her had been made prior to the filing of her complaint. 
This conduct, viewed in the light of human experience, 
shows most persuasively that the claim of gift was a 
complete after-thought, made upon advice of counsel. If 
this were not a fact, Mrs. Lovett would have taken the 
stand in rebuttal, as permitted by the Dead Man's 
Statute, and denied it. 
The verdict in this case upon Respondent's first 
cause of action lacks the· support of clear and convincing 
evidence and should accordingly be reversed. 
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II. THE EVIDENCE IS IN.SUFFICIENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF ON PLAINTIFF'S SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
1. '.Uhere is no evidence to support an express contract 
of employment as pleaded in plaintiff's complaint. · 
Paragraph 4 of plaintiff's second cause of action 
alleges "that between the first day of June, 1950, and the 
16th day of March, 1953, plaintiff rendered s·ervices to 
said deceased at said decea:sed's express instance and 
request of the reasonable value of Thirty-three Hundred 
Dollars ($3,300.00); that said deceased agreed to pay 
plaintiff the sum of Thirty-three Hundred Dollars 
($3,300.00) for said services." 
Rule 8 (e)(2), U.R.C.P., provides "a party may set 
forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or 
defense or in separate counts or defenses." 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, defend-
ant moved to dismiss the second cause of action of plain-
tiff's complaint upon the ground that the evidence failed 
as a matter of law to show an exp·ress agreement between 
plaintiff and Mrs. Giesy for payment of the sum of 
Thirty-three Hundred Dollars ($3,300.00) for services 
alleged to have been performed by plaintiff. Plaintiff 
contended that he·r pleading carne within the rule per-
mitting alternative statements of a claim in the same 
'count and that the motion therefore should be denied. 
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The same objection was raised by defendant in its 
requested instructions for the jury wherein defendant 
sought to have the issue of implied contract taken fro1n 
the jury. 
Rule 8 (e) (2) permits alternative statements o£ a 
claim but does not permit inconsistent staternents of a 
claim not pleaded alternatively. A fair reading of para-
graph 4 of plaintiff's second cause of action states a 
claim upon expres~s contract, the two sentences in that 
count being conjunctive rather than disjunctive. This 
being so, the issue of implied contract should not have 
been ·submitted to the jury and· defendant's motion to 
dismiss the second cause of action should have been 
granted at the close of plaintiff's evidence. 
In Morris v. Russell, (Utah, 1951) 236 P. (2d) 451, 
the plaintiff pleaded on one count an express contract 
for $100.00 per month and on another count for quantum 
meruit for the reasonable value of his services. At the 
conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the court granted 
a motion to strike the count in quantum meruit. After 
the presentation of the defendant's evidence, however, the 
court vacated its former ruling and reinstated the count. 
The S.upreme Court on appeal said that the adding of 
the quantum meruit count was equivalent to conform-
ing to the proof and that, since there was no showing 
that the defendants we-re mi'sled nor prevented from 
presenting their evidence or in any way prejudiced by 
reinstating the count, the trial court did not err in per-
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n1itting the case to go to the jury on the theory of implied 
contract. 
Where, however, the defendant does not have ade-
quate notice of his opponent's claim and is surprised, 
misled, or prejudiced in his defense, and has no oppor-
tunity to meet the i'ssues presented, it is error to subnut 
a case to the jury on a theory of implied contract when 
the cause of action was pleaded in express contract. See 
TO!JJl·or v. E. M. Royle Corp. (Utah, 1953), 264 P. (2d) 
279. 
Defendant in this case was p·repared to meet a claiin 
based upon an express contract. Defendant's investiga-
tion disclosed, and the trial confirmed, that there w;;:ts in 
fact no such contract. Defendant was relatively assured 
that any proof of express contract would have to co1ne 
from the plaintiff herself and, since defendant was of 
the opinion that the testimony of plaintiff would not be 
proper in this case, defendant considered it nece·ssary to 
be very cautious so as to avoid a waiver of the incoin-
petency of the . plaintiff as provided for by the Dead 
Man's Statute. 
If defendant had reasonably been apprised of the 
nature of the claim which would he made by plaintiff 
upon the trial of this case, defendant would have enl-
ployed pretrial discovery procedures to determine pre-
cisely what 'services plaintiff clain1ed were pe~formed 
and in all respects, defendant could have prepared itself 
to meet such proof. 
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Defendant, under the peculiar facts of this case, had 
no opportunity to determine the precise nature of plain-
tiff's claim by way of interrogatory or deposition of the 
plaintiff, since to employ either of those procedures 
might well have resulted in a waiver of the incompetency 
of the plaintiff. 
It is clearly apparent that this case comes within the 
rule of Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., supra, since defend-
ant was not, prior to the submission of plaintiff's evi-
dence in this case, ever called upon to meet a claim based 
upon quantum meruit. 
We earnestly submit that defendant was misled by 
plaintiff's pleading, surprised by the proof, and preju-
diced in the preparation of its defense. 
2. The evidence of implied contract of employment is 
insufficient as a matter of law to justify the v;erdict 
in favor of plaintiff. 
It is well settled that if, from all the circumstances 
surrounding the parties and under which the service~s 
were commenced and rendered, it can be reasonably 
inferred that the one expected to receive remuneration 
and the other intended to pay for the services, a promise 
to pay therefore may be implied. See Mathias v. Tingey, 
39 Utah 561, 118 P. 781 (1911). 
Correspondingly, if the circmnstances repel the 
inference that compensation was intended, no obligation 
to pay will .be implied. Thus it has generally been held 
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that.when one performs work for. another, relying solely 
upon his generosity in expectation of being rewarded by 
a gift or hy a legacy, wages are not demandable in an 
action -at law for the value thereof if the party 'benefited 
dies without making such p-rovision. "Circumstances 
other than relationship of parties which repel inference 
of an agreement to pay for work performed at one's 
request or with his acquiescence." 54 A.L.R., 548, citing 
Jacob v. Ursuline Nuns, 2 Mart. (La.) 269, 5 Am. Dec. 
730 (1812); GraffiAdin v. Reading, 10 N.J. Eq. 370 (1855) 
O'biter; Davison ·v. ·Davison, 13 N.J. Eq. 264 (1861) 
Obiter; ShakespeMe v. Ma.rkham, 10 Hun~ (N.Y.) 311 
(1877), affirmed in 72 N.Y. 300 (1878); Mille,r v. Lash 
(1881) 85 N.C. 51; Little v. Dawson, 4 Dall. (Pa.) 111, 1 
L. Ed. 763 (1791); Messi.er v. Messier, 34 R.I. 233, 82 
Atl. 9-66 (1912) Obiter. 
The issue 'before the court on this· appeal with 
respect to the p~rticular point now under consideration 
is, therefore: Whether the services were rendered under 
such circumstances a!s. the parties would reasonably con-
template that comp·ensation was intended, or whether the 
services rendered would reasonably be interpreted as a 
gratuity in expectation of a legacy. 
This would normally he a question of fact, but when 
the evidence, .as here,· fails to sh.ow circumstance's from 
which a promise to pay can r·easonably he inferred,. re-
spondent has failed to sustain her burden of proof. 
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An exa1nination of the record shows : 
Juliet Galena Giesy was 76 years of age at the time 
of her death. She had no close relatives, her husband 
having predeceased her (R. 25, 26) ; 
Harry D. Lovett, husband of respondent, was em-
ployed as an accountant for Utah Power & Light Com-
pany and had been so employed for 31 years (R. 24); 
Respondent began perforn1ing some personal serv-
ices for Mrs. Giesy on or about June 1, 1950. She was 
not seeking employment (R. 56); 
Reispondent never was paid "in money" for any of 
the services she clailned to have performed, even though 
she claims to have performed services extending over a 
period of just less than three years. Every other person 
who performed a service of any kind for Mrs. Giesy was 
paid regularly (R. 66, 67, 68); 
As appears from the entire record, and in spite of 
the efforts of Mr. Lovett to conceal this fact, the rela-
tionship of Mrs. Giesy and respondent was clearly some-
thing other than master and servant ; 
Mrs. Lovett was designated as "friend" on the 
admission records of the L.D.S. Hospital (R. 101); 
Respondent told Mrs. Winder, a friend of Mrs. 
Gi~sy, that she was taking care of Mrs. Giesy as a friend 
and that she was doing it because she loved her (R. 129); 
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When respondent becarne a\\7are of the provisions of 
Mrs. Giesy's will, she was "upset and shocked" (R. 131); 
No claim was ever 1nade for compensation for any 
services until after ·the death of Mrs. Giesy, indeed, not 
until the filing of this action ; 
Mr. Lovett, respondent and Mrs. Giesy spent con-
siderable time together in a social relationship; 
No conrment was ever made with reference to pay 
for respondent, except the con1m·ent that respondent 
would be well paid. 
It, therefore; appears clear from even a casual 
examination of this record that any services that might 
have been performed by respondent were· intended to be 
gratuitous, in expectation of a legacy. There is no sub-
stantial evidence giving rise to the inference that either 
respondent or Mrs. Giesy intended the services to be upon 
a reasonable charge basis. 
While a case of implied promise need not be n1ade 
O·Ut by overwhelming evidence, it is certainly true that 
a bill for .services alleged to have been re~dered to an old 
person for a considerable ti1ne before death without 
collecting on account, or without anything in writing to 
show the agreement, or without showing that any demand 
had ever been made on the one cared for and what the 
outcome of that demand was, should be carefully 
scrutinized before allowance by the executor, and should 
be carefully scrutinized by this court. 
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The picture which this record presents is one of a 
person rendering some services to an elderly lady of 
means as a friend, intended to be gratuitous from their 
inception, and understood by the recipient to be gratui-
tous until her death. It is undoubtedly true that respond-
ent expected a legacy and that she thought she was the 
recipient of a substantial legacy until the will was read. 
If she had thought herself to be an employee, she would 
certainly have made demand for payment at some time. 
A person in the peculiar position of Mrs. Lovett, how-
ever, might not be exp.ected to n1ake a demand since that 
might antagonize Mrs. Giesy and result in no legacy 
being provided. Respondent well knew this. hazard. 
Everything respondent did points directly to a hope that 
substantial provision would be made for her in Mrs. 
Giesy's will. 
Here respondent having pleaded but totally failed 
in her proof on express contract, asserted that Mrs. Giesy 
should reasonably have understood that respondent ex-
pected money for her apparent acts of kindness, that 
Mrs. Giesy should have known that Mrs. Lovett was 
motivated, not by friendship, but by expectation of gain. 
Respondent claims she was to be well paid. She 
claims that jewelry having by her evidence a retail value 
of $7,000.00 and a large diamond ring costing $2,070.00 
were given to her, but, apparently, that is not being well 
paid. She contends that Mrs. Giesy should have under-
stood that her "witto Nell" (Ex. 2) was working for 
wages. 
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The law has a substantial intel"est in protecting 
testamentary disposition of property. The law should 
and does, carefully scrutinize the activities of one who 
performs personal services . in an obvious attempt to 
ingratiate herself ·with an elderly lady of substantial 
means in the expectation of receiving a considerable 
legacy upon the death of the one befriended, and who 
when disappointed by the provision made, claims that all 
services were performed in reasonable expectation of 
payment by both parties to the relationship. This con-
duct is all too common, and should not be sanctioned by 
this court. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CHARGE TO 
THE JURY. 
1. Instruction No. 3 is erroneous as a matter of law 
in that it places the burden of negativing a gift 
upon the defendant. 
Instruction No. 3 was : 
"The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove by 
a preponde:rance of the evidence, as that term is 
hereinafter defined, the allegations of the 2nd 
cause of action of said complaint, as the same are 
set forth in Instruction No. 1; and the burden is 
upon the defendant to so prove the allegations of 
its counter-~laim, as the same are set forth in 
Instruction No. 2." 
This instruction placed the burden upon the defend-
ant to neg·ative the ele1nents of a· gift so far as the large 
diamond ring 'vas concerned, \Vhich is contrary to the 
rule of the recent case of Jones et al v. Cook (Utah, 1950) 
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223 P. 2d 423, and the case of Blackburn et al., v. Jones, 
59 Utah 558, 205 P. 582 (1922). 
The latter case was an action brought by an execu-
tor to quiet title to certain real property. The defendant 
claimed title through gift. A decree was entered quieting 
title in the defendant from which judgment the plaintiff 
appealed. The Court said that a court of equity will 
scrutinize with jealous care any claim such as was made 
by defendant and the burden will be upon him to satis-
factorily explain that the conveyance was made either as 
a gift or for a valuable consideration. The judgment was 
reversed. 
In Jones et al·, v. Cook, supra, th·e burden was upon 
the defendant, who claimed title by gift, to prove· his 
title by clear and convincing evidence. 
In the instant case, the respondent, as a part of her 
case in chief, set out to prove that a gift had hee:r:t made 
to her of the large ring by Mrs. Giesy. Since the title 
she claimed was derived by gift, she, not the executor, 
had the burden of proof upon this issue. 
Instruction No. 3 placed an impossible burden upon 
appellant. Appellant was required to prove that a gift 
of the large ring had not been made, and, as counsel for 
the Army in the recent McCarthy hearings, . Joseph 
Welch, recently said: "Any lawyer knows you cannot 
prove a negative." 
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Error up·on something as fundantental as the burden 
of proof, which is confused, not corrected, by the charge 
to the jury considered as a whole, properly requires a 
new trial. Particularly is this true where, as here, sub-
stantial p:rejudice results. 
2. Instruction No. 6 is erroneous as a matter of law 
in that it. is a misstatement of the law as it p.ertains 
to delivery of the subject of an alleged gift. 
Instruction No. 6 provides : 
"To constitute a gift inter vivos of personal 
property there must be a delivery of the· subject 
of the gift by the owner to the. donee, or to a third 
pe~son for the benefit of the donee, with the 
intention to transfer title of the p·roperty to the 
donee. When property is so delivered with such 
intent, it becomes the property of the donee and 
the owner has no further interest therein. 
"If you believe and find from the evidence 
that Mrs. Giesy delivered the jewelry in question 
to plaintiff, or authorized or directed Mrs. Mad-
docks to deliver the jewelry to plaintiff, with the 
intent that the jewelry was to go to and belong to 
plaintiff as her own property, then you are in-
structed that a valid gift of the jewelry was made 
to plaintiff and on. this issue your verdict must 
he in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on 
plaintiff's first cause of action." 
It is fundamental that delivery to a third person, 
unless that p·erson receives as trustee for the donee, is 
not a sufficient delivery to complete a gift. This question 
is to be determined from· the intention of the donor, the 
situation and relationship of the parties, the kind and 
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character of the pToperty, and the things said and done 
in regard thereto. If the property remains under the 
control of the donor although in the keeping of a third 
person and the third peTson is. subject to the further 
direction of the donor as to its final disposition then the 
third person's relationship is that of agent.· See Reed 
et al. v. Knudson, et al., 80 Utah 428, 16 P. (2d) 347 
(1932). 
In this case any delivery to Mrs. Maddocks would 
have been as agent for the donor and, since under the 
instruction the jury could have found that delivery to 
Mrs. Maddocks was a sufficient delivery to constitute a 
completed gift, the instruction was erroneous and 
prejudicial. 
This is true even though there was sorne: evidence 
produced by the respondent to the effect that the jewelry 
was thereafter. handed to respondent since the jury was 
not required to believe, and there was no evidence to 
show, that delivery to -respondent was ever intended by 
Mrs. Giesy to be completed, whether immediately or at 
all. In this connection it is significant that respondent's 
evidence showed that Mrs. Maddocks was to take the 
jewelry to the hospital and were it not for the fact that 
she blew out a tire the jewelry would have been taken 
to the hosp·ital where presumably Mrs. Giesy would have 
retained some control over it. The evidence in this regard 
was not clear and convincing and was made even less so 
by the erroneous instruction with reference to one of the 
vital elements of a gift. 
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CONCLUSION 
C·ases are all too comn1on in which friends of a 
deceased take charge of personal belongings so that they 
will not be left in a vacant apartment and then later 
claim that a gift of the belongings had been 1nade. Such 
a claim can in Inost cases be asserted without fear of 
contradiction, since the lips of the other party to the 
transaction have been sealed by death. 
It is significant in this case to observe the gradual 
change of position asserted by Mrs.-Lovett from the time 
of Mrs. Giesy's death until the time of the filing of this 
action. She first readily admitted that she was holding 
the jewelry for safekeeping and much later as ·an after-
thought, and when advised to do· so by counsel, she 
asserted absolute ownership, but, even then, only through 
her counsel. She herself never at any time claimed that 
a gift had been made to her. She never at any time con-
tradicted the te,stimony of Dr. Smith, with whom she 
was friendly, nor that of Mr. Skeen, or Mr. O'Meara, 
even though she was competent under the Dead Man's 
Statute to testify as to these n1atters in rebuttal had 
she so desired. 
Claims of gifts asserted after the death .of the 
alleged donor must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence. The law of wills has been developed ove.r 
centuries and formal requirements have been laid down 
by courts and by legislatures to insure that a person 
who makes testamentary disposition of his property can 
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die with the conviction that hi~s wishes, as solemnly 
expressed, will be carried out by his executor. 
Mrs. Giesy's intention as shown by 'her will (Ex. 21) 
was that Anona Guthrie, her cousin's wife receive her 
jewelry. Appellant was charged with the responsibility 
of executing Mrs. Giesy's will and giving expression to 
her intention. Such intention should not he, frustrated 
upon evidence which is uncertain and unconvincing. 
Also far too common are claims for compensation 
proceeding from disappointment in the terms of a will. 
Such claims are as old as reported decisions, for examp1·e, 
Little v. Daffin, supra, decided in 1791. Such claims 
must be scrutin.ized carefully by reviewing courts, and 
where, as here, are contradicted by all of the objective 
evidence in the case, must he rejected. 
Appellant respectfully urges that the evidence in 
this case lacks the quality of clear and convincing evi-
dence and, therefore, fails to support the verdict; that 
the instructions given on delivery and on the burden of 
proof were manifestly erroneous; that these errors re-
sulted in substantial prejudice to appellant in the trial 
of this case; and that the judgment, accordingly, should 
be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
Resp·ectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, THUR.MAN, WORSLEY 
& SNOW, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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